TORT AND QUASI-CONTRACT
Liability under quasi-contract arises from the principle that if someone receives an unjust benefit, they must return it to the rightful owner. For instance, if X buys a TV from Y and pays Y, mistakenly believing Y owns the TV, and Y accepts the payment, honestly believing they are entitled to it, but it later emerges that A and Co. are the true owners and they recover the TV from X, then Y must return the payment to X.
Y is obligated to return the payment not due to tortious liability, as Y's mistake in receiving the payment was honest and therefore not a tort.
While both tort and quasi-contract involve duties imposed by law, they differ significantly. In a quasi-contract, the duty is towards a specific person, whereas in tort law, the duty is owed to the public at large.
Additionally, in a quasi-contract, compensation is always monetary and predetermined, whereas in tort law, the remedy usually involves unliquidated damages.
TORT AND TRUST
Trust law is a subset of property law. In a trust, a person known as the trustee holds property for the use and benefit of another person, the beneficiary. If a trustee misappropriates property held in trust for a beneficiary, the beneficiary can seek compensation. However, the compensation will typically be the value of the misappropriated property, which can be determined in advance. Therefore, the damages claimed are liquidated, not unliquidated.
This highlights a key distinction between tort and trust: in tort cases, unliquidated damages are claimed, while in trust transactions, only liquidated damages are claimed.
MENTAL ELEMENT IN TORT
Sir John Salmond suggested that liability should always be based on fault. According to him, a person should only be held liable for a wrongful act if it was committed intentionally or with culpable negligence. He argued that it is unjust to require someone to pay damages if the injury was unintentional or accidental. Salmond believed that the principle from criminal law, which states that a person can only be convicted if they had the requisite mens rea (guilty mind), should also apply to civil liability.
FAULT WHEN RELEVANT
In many tort cases, the intention or culpability of the wrongdoer is crucial in determining liability. For torts such as conspiracy, assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, battery, and deceit, the wrongdoer's intention is particularly relevant.
FAULT WHEN IRRELEVANT
Fault has never been, and is not today, an essential element of tortious liability, meaning the mental element is irrelevant, and liability can arise even without wrongful intention or culpable negligence on the part of the defendant. Examples include the tort of conversion, tort of defamation, vicarious liability, and the rules of strict and absolute liability
MALICE IN LAW AND MALICE IN FACT
MALICE IN LAW
In legal terms, malice means more than just an evil motive. It can signify either (a) the intentional commission of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, or (b) an action driven by an improper motive.
Bangley, J., in Bromage v. Prosser (1825) 4B and C 247, 255, defined legal malice as: "Malice in common acceptation means ill-will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause, or excuse."
Thus, in law, malice refers to a wrongful intention presumed in the case of an unlawful act, rather than merely a bad motive or ill-will.
MALICE IN FACT (EVIL MOTIVE)
Malice in fact refers to an evil motive behind a wrongful act. When a person commits a wrongful act with a feeling of ill-will, the act is said to be done "maliciously."
As a general rule in tort law, a person's motives are irrelevant. The law typically considers what the defendant has done, not why they did it. A good motive does not justify an otherwise illegal act, and a bad motive does not render an otherwise legal act wrongful.
CASES
Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles (1895 AC 587)
The House of Lords decided this case, involving Pickles, who was annoyed at the Bradford Corporation's refusal to purchase his land for a water supply scheme. In retaliation, Pickles sank a shaft on his land, diverting water that percolated through his land from the Corporation's property. The Corporation sued for an injunction to stop Pickles from diminishing or polluting their water, arguing that his actions were unlawful due to his evil motive. However, the House of Lords upheld the settled law that intercepting underground water is not actionable, even if done intentionally [Chasemore v. Richards (1859) 7 HLC 349]. They rejected the Corporation's contention, with Lord Watson stating, "No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can become illegal because it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious." Similarly, Lord Macnaghten emphasized that motives are immaterial, as it is the act, not the motive, that must be considered. If the act causes damage without legal injury, the motives, however reprehensible, will not supply that element.
Allen v. Flood (1896 AC 1)
In this case, the plaintiffs, two shipwrights employed by X, were dismissed due to pressure from the trade union of ironworkers, represented by Allen. The ironworkers objected to the plaintiffs' employment because they had previously done ironwork, and Allen threatened a strike unless the plaintiffs were dismissed. X, exercising his legal right, discharged them. The plaintiffs sued Allen, but the House of Lords held that Allen had done no unlawful act and used no unlawful means. Despite any malicious motives, his conduct was not actionable. The House of Lords established that an act lawful in itself is not converted into an unlawful act by a malicious motive. For example, prosecuting someone for a crime they committed or making defamatory statements that are true remains lawful, regardless of malicious intent. Similarly, a landowner's right to do harm to adjoining properties through acts on his own land, such as blocking light or draining water, is unaffected by his motives. The law does not consider whether the acts are driven by a desire to improve one's property or harm others.
Town Area Committee v. Prabhu Dayal (AIR 1975)
In this case, the plaintiff constructed a building without complying with the U.P. Municipalities Act, and the defendants demolished it. The plaintiff contended that the demolition was illegal because some Town Area Committee officers acted maliciously. The Allahabad High Court held that the demolition was lawful, regardless of any malicious intent. Justice Hari Swaroop stated, "The plaintiff can get compensation only if he proves to have suffered injury because of an illegal act of the defendant and not otherwise. Malice does not enter the scene at all. A legal act though motivated by malice, will not make the actor liable to pay damages... merely because some officer has malice against a citizen who has committed a wrong will not render the action of the authority invalid if it is otherwise in accordance with law. Mere malice cannot disentitle a person from taking recourse to law for getting the wrong undone. It is, therefore, not necessary to investigate whether the action was motivated by malice or not."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
There are certain special cases, which admittedly form an exception to the rule of irrelevance of motive in the law of torts in which motive is relevant. They are:-
(a) Wrongs of defamation on a privileged occasion – privilege loses when evil motive is shown.
(b) Malicious prosecution.
(c) Injurious falsehood, slander of goods etc.
(d) Nuisance.
(e) Conspiracy.
(f) Unlawful interference with another’s lawful activities.
(g) Evil motive may aggravate damages.
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